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Rule 609 and the Frustratingly
Unkillable Five-Factor Mahone
Framework
Thanks Colin for inviting me to be a guest
blogger!  I wanted to start my stint with a
somewhat technical critique of the courts’
application of Evidence Rule 609 – I see this
as one of the lowest hanging fruits in terms
of things I would love to change in modern
evidence jurisprudence, and a fairly
important one for criminal trial practice.
Every few weeks, an American court
publishes an opinion that explains why a
defendant’s criminal conviction was
admissible to impeach his credibility under
Federal Rule of Evidence 609, or a state
analogue. See Federal Rule Evidence of 609
(permitting prosecution to impeach a
defendant with prior convictions “if the court
determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the accused”).  The
opinion inevitably contains an argument
along these lines:  the defendant’s
testimony, in which he claimed to be
innocent, was “important” and his credibility
“central” to the case and therefore
impeachment was necessary to allow the
jury to render a proper verdict.
Here is a recent example:
“The court agrees with the
government that the . . .
Defendant’s testimony will
conflict with that of the
government's witnesses,
making Defendant’s credibility
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central to the case.  As
Defendant’s testimony and
credibility will be of great
importance, the court believes
99–CF–491 may be used as
impeachment evidence
should Defendant elect to
testify.”
U.S. v. Sutton, No. 10–CR–
20048, 2011 WL 2671355, 5
(C.D.Ill. July 8, 2011)
This reasoning reflects a misunderstanding
of the applicable legal standard – a
misunderstanding that is now so common
that it seems almost futile to try to correct it. 
At the same time, the flaw in the reasoning
described above is so obvious it is difficult to
understand its persistence.  Every time a
defendant testifies, his testimony will be
“important” (if believed) and therefore his
credibility will be “central to the case.”  How
can these factors – which will always be
present in this form – be determinants
ofwhether to allow impeachment under Rule
609?
The surprising answer is that this analysis
flows directly from a flawed, five-factor
balancing test – a test that was distilled from
a pre-Rules case (Gordon v. United States,
383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967)) by United
States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.
1976).  TheMahone factors, explicitly
intended to govern Rule 609 decisions, have
spread like a plague through state and
federal courts.  They are:
"(1) The impeachment value of the prior
crime.
(2) The point in time of the conviction
and the witness’ subsequent history.
(3) The similarity between the past
crime and the charged crime.
(4) The importance of the defendant’s
testimony.
(5) The centrality of the credibility
issue."  Mahone, at 929.
I declared war (academically speaking, of
course) upon this framework in an article
entitledCircumventing Congress: How the
Federal Courts Opened the Door to
Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior
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Convictions, 42 U.C. Davis Law Rev. 289
(2008).  So far the framework is winning.  But
today, thanks to EvidenceProf Blog, I open up
a new front:
The fourth and fifth factors are the obvious
culprits in the reasoning described above. 
Interestingly, though, if you trace these
factors back to Gordon from whence they
came, it is clear that the fourth factor was
actually intended to protect defendants from
impeachment.  The idea was that if the
impeachment is allowed, a defendant will
decline to testify, and as a result the jury will
be deprived of his testimony.   Gordon at
940.  If that testimony is “important,”  then, the
trial court should be reluctant to allow
impeachment.  Id.
It is less clear what the Mahone court
intended by the fifth factor; the court likely was
thinking of the portion ofGordon where the
D.C. Circuit emphasized that the case “had
narrowed to the credibility of two persons, the
accused and his accuser” creating a critical
need for additional information that might
shed light on which witness to
believe.  Gordon at 941.  (In Gordon, the
defendant had also impeached the accuser
with a prior conviction.  Id.at 938-39.)
In their original incarnation, the fourth and
fifthMahone factors were always in tension. 
When the defendant had something
important to tell the jury – e.g., “I am not guilty
because . . . ” – the fourth factor suggested
that impeachment should be prohibited,
while the fifth factor arguably suggested that
impeachment should be allowed.  If faithfully
interpreted, these factors would, for the most
part, cancel each other out.  This is not how
things have played out.
Over the past decades and continuing to the
present, the courts have steadily lost sight of
the meaning of the fourth factor and, without
explanation, gradually transformed it.  In
modern application, as illustrated in the
excerpt above, the fourth factor is reversed
and generally combined with the fifth factor to
create a mega, pro-impeachment factor (“the
importance of the defendant’s credibility”).
Make no mistake, the federal District Court
quoted above is just following the lead of its
appellate court.  Here is the Seventh Circuit
recently making the same mistake:
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“Here, [the defendant-] Toliver’s
testimony and credibility were central to
the case: either he was lying or [the
govt. witness] was lying. Thus, although
the similarity of [Toliver’s] two crimes
increased the risk of prejudice, the
importance of Toliver’s
credib ilityweighed in favor of
admissibility.”
U.S. v. Toliver, 374 Fed.Appx. 655, 658,
2010 WL 882840, 3 (7thCir. 2010)
(italics added).
 The Minnesota appellate courts make no
effort to obscure their conflation of the two
factors, explaining in an oft-quoted passage:
 “If credibility is a central issue in the
case, the fourth and fifth. . . factors
weigh in favor of admission of the prior
convictions.”  
State v. Odeneal, 2011 WL 1833018, 4
(Minn.App. 2011) (quotingSwanson, 707
N.W.2d at 655) (itals added).
Here is a recent decision from Maryland:
“One of the critical considerations the
jury had to contemplate was the
question of whom to believe—[the
defendant-]Cure or the identifying
detective.  Cure’s testimony, which
amounted to the bulk of his defense,
made ‘credibility ... the central issue’ in
the case, and, therefore, factors four
and five weigh heavily in favor of
admissibility.”
Cure v. State, --- A.3d ----, 2011 WL
3568839, 15 (Md. Aug. 16 2011)
At its core, this frustratingly common
interpretive error is just a misunderstanding
of the meaning of the fourth Mahonefactor. 
Courts are simply applying it backwards. 
This is clear in a recent Texas case where
the court erroneously says that the fact that
the defendant’s testimony was not important
(because others testified to the same effect)
“militate[s] against admissibility.”  Phelps v.
State, No. 07–10–00443–CR, 2011 WL
2582810, 3 (Tex.App. 2011)  The Texas court
nevertheless ruled that impeachment was
still proper because “the credibility of
appellant's testimony was critical” – although
how that could be true if his testimony was
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not important is left unexplained. Id. 
What to do?  It would be best if courts would
simply stop applying the hopelessly flawed
five-factor framework (and particularly the
4thand 5th factors) and focus instead on the
familiar concepts of unfair “prejudice” and
“probative value” invoked by Rule 609.  At a
minimum, however, if the courts are going to
continue to apply this multi-factor framework,
they must apply it correctly, recognizing that
the fourth factor is not the same as the fifth
factor – but is, more accurately, its opposite.
 If an opinion emphasizes that the
defendant’s testimony is important, then that
is a factor that supports exclusion,
not admission, of the defendant’s criminal
record. See Gordon at 941 n.11 (explaining
that the trial judge should “consider whether
the defendant’s testimony is so important
that he should not be forced to elect between
staying silent-risking prejudice due to the
jury’s going without one version of the facts-
and testifying- risking prejudice through
exposure of his criminal past”).
Jeff Bellin
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